University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC)

Annenberg School for Communication

6-2000

Media Multiplication and Social Segmentation
Elihu Katz
University of Pennsylvania, ekatz@asc.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers

Recommended Citation
Katz, E. (2000). Media Multiplication and Social Segmentation. Ethical Perspectives, 7 (2-3), 122-132.
Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/161

Publisher URL: http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/page.php?LAN=E&FILE=ep_detail&ID=26&TID=136
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/161
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Media Multiplication and Social Segmentation
Abstract
By now, everybody has heard of the `bourgeois public sphere,' that moment in history when a rising
merchant class felt empowered enough to deliberate public policy rationally and universalistically, and to
transmit its conclusions to the powers-that-were with the expectation of being taken seriously. By
academic standards Habermas's (1962/1989) thesis has become a household word, perhaps because it
offers a nostalgic reminder of a lost utopia of participatory democracy, or because it offers hope of what
yet might be — if we could only learn to translate the seventeenth century into the ostensibly compatible
conditions of a modernity in which widespread education, universal suffrage and the new
communications technologies would seem to invite such translation.
But this is not the whole of Habermas's thesis, nor its most original part. The rest of it revolves around the
`representative public sphere' which refers both to the period that preceded, and the period that followed,
that of the newly autonomous bourgeoisie. In the earlier period, it refers to the person of the monarch, to
the dazzle and charisma of his regalia, symbols of the legitimacy of his rule and the unity of his realm.
That's not such a new idea either.
What is new is Habermas's suggestion that the period following the `bourgeois public sphere' — that is,
our here and now — is essentially a return to the charisma of the `representative public sphere,' not that of
the absolute monarch to be sure, but of a political and economic establishment that has armed itself with
image makers and spin doctors who dazzle and charm in the name of the legitimacy and prerogatives of
their clients. As Calhoun (1992) puts it, summarizing Habermas, “By means of these transformations, the
public sphere has become more an arena for advertising than a setting for rational/critical debate.
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Media Multiplication and Social Segmentation1
Elihu Katz
By now, everybody has heard of the `bourgeois
public sphere,' that moment in history when a rising
merchant class felt empowered enough to deliberate
public policy rationally and universalistically, and
to transmit its conclusions to the powers-that-were
with the expectation of being taken seriously. By
academic standards Habermas's (1962/1989) thesis
has become a household word, perhaps because it
offers a nostalgic reminder of a lost utopia of
participatory democracy, or because it offers hope
of what yet might be — if we could only learn to
translate the seventeenth century into the ostensibly
compatible conditions of a modernity in which
widespread education, universal suffrage and the
new communications technologies would seem to
invite such translation.
But this is not the whole of Habermas's thesis,
nor its most original part. The rest of it revolves
around the `representative public sphere' which
refers both to the period that preceded, and the
period that followed, that of the newly autonomous
bourgeoisie. In the earlier period, it refers to the
person of the monarch, to the dazzle and charisma
of his regalia, symbols of the legitimacy of his rule
and the unity of his realm. That's not such a new
idea either.
What is new is Habermas's suggestion that the
period following the `bourgeois public sphere' —
that is, our here and now — is essentially a return to
the charisma of the `representative public sphere,'
not that of the absolute monarch to be sure, but of a
political and economic establishment that has
armed itself with image makers and spin doctors
who dazzle and charm in the name of the
legitimacy and prerogatives of their clients.2 As
Calhoun (1992) puts it, summarizing Habermas,
“By means of these transformations, the public
sphere has become more an arena for advertising
than a setting for rational/critical debate.

Legislators stage displays for constituents. Special
interest organizations use publicity to increase the
prestige of their own positions, without making the
topics to which these positions refer subjects of
genuine public debate. The media are used to create
occasions for consumers to identify with the public
positions or personae of others. All this amounts to
the return of a version of representative publicity,
to which the public responds by acclamation, or the
withholding of acclamation, rather than critical
discourse.”
With that as a preface, this paper will proceed in
three parts. Part One will develop the idea of the
classic public sphere, drawing not so much on
Habermas, but on some of his predecessors and
others, and especially on the French social psychologist, Gabriel Tarde. I will show how Tarde's
conception of the public sphere applies not only to
the newspaper but perhaps even more to broadcasting. I will say a few words about how well the
European model of public broadcasting fits (or
better: used to fit) this vision of the public sphere. I
will also introduce data from a recent American
study that puts Tarde's scheme to an empirical test.
Then, I will shift gears. Still drawing on Tarde
— but a different Tarde — Part Two will show
another side of the same story, focusing more on
the technology of the media, and their effect, not on
individuals but on institutions. This part of the
argument will show how the media, in succession
— newspapers, radio, TV, internet — contribute not
to the making of democracy, but to its unmaking.
This part will lead to a discussion of our present
situation of multi-channel television — over the air,
on cable, via satellite — and the internet. To
anticipate the climax of this part, let me say that we
will find ourselves arguing that the new media are
no longer geared to the nation-state and the public
sphere.
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The concluding Part Three will try to confront
the opposing tendencies of the two earlier parts.
But it will do so in an academic effort at puzzlesolving rather than as a statement of deep conviction. The truth is I don't know the answers.
Part I.
Gabriel Tarde's Public Sphere
The idea of a public sphere in which government is
the addressee of a society of citizens did not
originate with Habermas, of course. It is essentially
a restatement of the emergence of a public opinion
which, to my mind, was best characterized by Hans
Speier (1950). Distinguishing private or clandestine
opinion, from 'opinions disclosed to others', Speier
conceives of public opinion as a two-fold process
of communication whereby (1) citizens deliberate
with each other over issues of public concern, and
(2) transmit these deliberations to government. Like
Habermas, Speier adds that the persons deliberating
should not themselves be officials of the state and
that their deliberations should be anchored in a
shared belief both in freedom of expression and the
right to be influential. The interweaving of opinion
and communication also figures in de Tocqueville's
(1935/1969) well-known interest in American
associationism, in Lord Bryce's (1985/1991)
observations about the press and conversation, and
in other classic writings.
My own favorite is Gabriel Tarde, the French
jurist, criminologist, and social psychologist whose
turn-of-the-century
essay,
`Opinion
and
Conversation` (Tarde, 1901/1989) spells out the
four elements of the public sphere: press, conversation, opinion and action. I dare say that Tarde
was not so much interested in a normative theory of
democracy, but rather in observing how collective
behaviour was pressed, willy nilly, into the service
of democracy.1 There are several advantages to
drawing on Tarde more than the others. First of all,
he knows what a conversation sounds like. Unlike
Habermas, Tarde alludes to the kinds of
conversations that actually went on in cafes,
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coffeehouses, and salons. These are the familiar,
intimate, aimless interchanges that wander in and
out of political matters, but are by no means limited
to them. The conversations, Tarde noted, go on
among individuals who are rather similar to each
other, both in status and in worldview. They are not
what Habermas calls forth in his ideal speech
situations; they do not involve 'bracketings` of
status or acceptance of the rules of reason before
setting foot in the public arena. Nor would they
qualify for what Michael Schudson (1997) would
call 'political talk,' which, in his view, is
confrontational, and often painful, talk among
ideological adversaries aiming toward legislation,
as in parliaments. By contrast, Tarde's
conversations are pleasurable, usually effortless.
A second advantage of calling on Tarde is that
he treats the four elements of the public sphere as a
linear system such that (1) the press, typically
reporting on government, delivers an agenda of
issues for discussion (2) to persons gathered in the
cafes, coffeehouses and salons where talk goes on.
These conversations (3) percolate opinions,
clarifying them as they move from cafe to cafe and
crystallize into one or two public opinions, which
are translated (4) into action. By action, Tarde
refers both to choice at the individual level —
voting, for example, but also consumer choices —
and the reactions of government to public opinion.
Tarde's definition of action at the individual level is
rather weak, limited as it is to making choices, but
he is keenly aware of how the representation of
consensual opinion by the press constitutes what he
calls a “brake on government.”
A third advantage of Tarde is that he takes us
beyond functional theory to the edge of technological determinism. From this point of view, the
press is not just a purveyor of information or a
supplier of agendas; it is also a powerful agent of
nation-building. Tarde sees the press as an essential
agent of national integration.

_______________________________________________________________________________________
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The shared language of the press and its circulation
defines the nation's borders, and the shared
experience of reading the day's agenda — aware
that everyone else in one's orbit is doing the same
thing at the same time — creates a sense of
nationhood, what Benedict Anderson (1991) calls
`imagined community.'
Tarde shows how this sense of shared membership also unified the parliament. Prior to the
press, says Tarde, delegates of the several provinces
each had veto power over the applicability of rules
and laws to their particular constituencies. As the
experience of community grew stronger, thanks to
the press, majority rule was introduced, and became
binding on all.
Applying Tarde to Broadcasting
A quarter of a century after Tarde's death, radio
broadcasting was to begin. At the functional level,
the new medium seemed a great step forward for
participatory democracy, fulfilling the promise of
simultaneity to which the press had aspired,
enfranchising the less literate, and creating a new
focus of shared experience of culture and of politics. Both the American and British models of how
radio might be governed served these functions.
The United States licensed individual stations
which soon formed themselves into a small number
of commercial networks to cover the entire country,
purveying a diet of entertainment, and ultimately of
news, and the advertising which paid the bills.
Britain explicitly rejected the American model,
thanks to John Reith, who argued that the airwaves
were not only public property, but a potential
public utility which could build the nation as a
shared community of culture and civic discussion.
It was Reith, almost single-handedly, who
persuaded the British government to transform the
monopoly it had first given to an association of
radio manufacturers into a public broadcasting
authority which aimed to be independent both of
government and of commerce (Briggs, 1961). The
BBC was an important social invention. It is
striking that a government should (by law and by
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convention) voluntarily relinquish its control of the
airwaves in favour of a service of information,
education and entertainment operated by
professionals with a paternalistic orientation,
overseen by an apolitical board of distinguished
people, and owned, in effect, by a public of
shareholders paying a quasi-tax directly to the
Broadcasting Authority itself. It is something like
the idea of a tax-supported public university, but
riskier, inasmuch as the day-to-day mass production of quality entertainment and critical discourse
could, and sometimes does, turn against government itself.
Cardiff and Scannell (1987) graphically describe how the new-born BBC began to invent
traditions that would connect the several British
regions to each other in the celebration of religious
and civic holidays. It brought the periphery to the
centre, and the centre to the periphery — in the
King's annual Christmas message, for example.
Even before the establishment of a broadcast news
service — when the objections of newspapers were
finally overcome, both in Britain and the U.S. —
radio was a powerful agent of national integration,
and in both World Wars served as the hallmark of
togetherness.
After World War II, television followed in
radio's footsteps as the medium of national integration, pushing radio into its new role as medium
of segmentation and everyman's personal
companion. Soon, there were radio stations for
every age, status, and interest group, while television took over as the national focus of culture and
politics. Over the `objections' of the Frankfurt
School (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972), who
feared nothing as much as the homogenization of
the culture of the classes, television did just that: it
committed the crime of melding “Benny Goodman
and the Budapest String Quartet” into a false
consciousness of national unity, or, if we put
hegemony aside, into just a plain fusion of national
identity.

_______________________________________________________________________________________
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Wherever broadcasting went, the norms of
balance and fairness went with it. The American
institution of pre-election television debates is an
example of the ostensible rational/critical balance
which television has brought to politics. The idea
that the electorate should get a good look at the
candidates in a rule-governed contest has now
become virtually universal, and has spread even
beyond the democracies. Altogether, it seems fair
to say, with Ithiel Pool (1983), that democratic
polities were well served by broadcasting — both
radio and television — and that public broadcasting,
perhaps especially in its monopolistic phase,
provided both an agenda and a forum for the public
sphere.
An Empirical Example
Lest you think this is all too pretty — you won't in a
few minutes — I can document empirically that
Tarde's system works. Together with Joohan Kim,
my doctoral student, and Robert Wyatt, we have
shown, for the United States, that there is indeed a
linear relationship among press (that is, media),
conversation, opinion, and action. The results of
our national survey, published recently (Kim,
Wyatt, Katz, 1999; Wyatt, Kim, Katz, 2000)
demonstrate that the frequency of reading
newspapers and, to a lesser extent, the frequency of
viewing television news, increases political (and
even personal) conversation. This is true after the
obvious background variables, and even political
interest, have been taken into account. You will not
be surprised to learn that the most frequently
discussed issues are crime and education, followed
by the economy, local and national government,
and lastly, foreign affairs. Family matters,
entertainment and sports were more frequent
subjects of discussion than most of the political
issues, however. You may be surprised that the
extent of viewing TV in general — not especially
news — increased such personal, but not political,
conversation.
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The locus of discussion — of political as well as
personal matters — is the home, followed by the
workplace and civic organizations. Presumably,
this reflects the home-centred character of the
media, the protected environment of the home, and,
not least, the evident fact that spouses seem to have
begun to talk politics with each other.4 This means,
of course, that political conversation is not often
confrontational; it goes on among the like-minded.
Moreover, our findings suggest that when crime
and education are discussed at home, they are often
moved out of the political and into the personal
domain. In our study, restaurants, bars and
shopping malls — today's equivalent of cafes —
were not important loci of political conversation;
neither was the internet.
Following Tarde, we then ask whether and how
political conversation affects opinion. The answer
is that it increases the number of issues on which
people hold opinions, and equips discussants with
the ability to offer more reasons in defence of their
opinions. To our surprise, however, conversation
does not appear to increase the consistency among
an individual's opinions.
These measures of the quality of opinion contribute, but not strongly, to political participation
such as attending political meetings, working in
political campaigns, contacting candidates by letter
or by telephone, and voting. Political conversation,
on the other hand, is a major contributory factor in
political participation, along with being male,
having higher income, and following the news.
Voilà. Participatory democracy is alive, and the
media have a central share in its functioning. Or do
they?
Part II.
Another Look at Tard
If we take a second look, we will find another
Tarde, less functionally oriented, and far more
concerned with the effects of the media — the
newspaper, in his case — on institutions.
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To a certain extent, we might even say that Tarde is
a technological theorist, anticipating McLuhan
(1964), Innis (1950) and Eisenstein (1979), more
interested in the medium than the message. Looking back, we have already had a glimpse of this
Tarde, in his discussion of the role of the newspaper in national integration, both of the nation as a
whole, and in the parliament, where the newspaperenriched sense of nationhood constrained majority
rule.
But Tarde takes a further step in this role, in
asserting that the newspaper overthrew the monarchy. His argument is based on the idea that only
the king — the representative public sphere — had
had knowledge of what was going on in the various
villages and regions of his realm; he had spies and
bureaucrats to tell him, and he was in no special
hurry to let Village A find out what Village B was
thinking. The newspaper did exactly this and
thereby undermined the king, says Tarde: it made
him redundant.
Applying This Tarde to the Electronic Media
If we apply this line of thinking to the media that
succeeded the newspaper — radio, television, and
now the internet — a new picture will emerge, very
different from the one we have just seen. Radio,
then television, not only displaced the newspaper,
and each other, as the predominant medium of
national integration; they not only served the public
sphere functionally; they also — like the newspaper
— gnawed away at the institutions of governance.
In the case of radio, first of all, we may note that
the earliest political users of radio — in the United
States and in Germany — were Roosevelt and,
mutatis mutandis, Hitler. Soon after assuming
office in the early ‘30s, Roosevelt began his series
of fireside chats, through which he established an
intimate relationship with families at home who
responded, with warmth, to his plan for a New
Deal, and, years later, to his attempt to persuade
Americans that the United States must commit
itself to an active role in World War II. Note that
radio appeals went directly from the president to
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the people, over the heads of the Congress, creating
a personalized leadership that ultimately led to
what would be called, in Nixon's day, the `imperial
presidency.'
Hitler, of course, went further. He simply
disbanded the parliament and spoke directly to the
people at mass rallies and over the radio. Victor
Klemperer's (1998) diaries give us a glimpse of the
ceremony that surrounded Hitler's harangues, and
the diarist's fear of their effectiveness.5 Both leaders
inspired a high rate of participation. But we see
here the beginning of the erosion of the
rational/critical ideal, and the weakening of the
intermediacy of the parliament in favour of the
charisma of the leader. Indeed, it looks like the
king's revenge. The newspaper overthrew charisma,
and radio reinstated it.
If we now apply this kind of analysis to television, we see more of the same institutional
slippage. It seems obvious that television finished
what radio had begun. It moved politics inside the
home. Although Hallin and Mancini have
suggested that television news sends Italian viewers
outside, in search of discussion and interpretation
— in the piazza, at the trade-union hall or at party
headquarters — it seems more likely that Lazarsfeld
and Merton (1948) were right in proposing that
broadcast news, typically, dies in the living room.
True, our own research suggests that conversation
follows viewing and that conversation often leads
to political action, a lot remains to be done to
validate the image of the home as a public place,
and political action as a widespread phenomenon. It
is too soon to abandon the idea that broadcast news
may have a `narcotizing dysfunction' for most
viewers.
A more radical formulation of this process
would propose that television disintermediated the
political party. Neighbourhood party organization
has all but disappeared, and political allegiances
have weakened substantially in the Western world
(Lipset and Reinhard, 1992).
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There is good reason to suppose, at the level of
media ethics, that the even-handedness of
television, and its visual imagery, have something
to do with this — together with moving politics
inside, of course. The huge viewership of American
pre-election debates, for example, combats the
selective attention of an earlier day. It used to be
that one rallied, or read, or listened only to one's
own side (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948), whereas today's
television debates invite attention to both sides
equally (Kraus, 1962). And what one sees and
hears is very centrist talk, and well-rehearsed
sounds and images. As a result, the candidates seem
almost equally acceptable. Neither party affiliation
nor ideology is much on display, and programmes
of action look and sound rather similar.
Ostensibly, the absence of political parties
should not be at odds with Habermasian discourse,
which strives for a rhetoric of reason; but it is hard
to say that contemporary election campaigns, even
television debates, epitomize rational interaction
from which optimal answers for the commonwealth
will likely emerge.6 Habermas, who fears all kinds
of visual representation (Peters, 1993), would
certainly agree. Calhoun (1992) quotes him as
saying that “the sphere generated by the mass
media has taken on the traits of a secondary realm
of intimacy.” “We experience radio, film and
television
communication,”
in
Calhoun's
paraphrase, with an immediacy far greater than that
characteristic of the printed word. One of the
effects of this on public discourse is that
`bracketing' personal attributes and concentrating
on the rational-critical argument becomes more
difficult. This feeds into a more general
sentimentality toward persons and corresponding
cynicism toward institutions, which curtails the
“subjective capacity for rational criticism of public
authority, even where it might objectively still be
possible.' A personalized politics revives
representative publicity by making candidates into
media stars.”
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So, in the same way that newspaper overthrew
the king, we may say that radio disintermediated
the parliament in favour of the (elected) leader, and
television undermined the political party, in favour
of a politics of personality. What's next?
The New Media Technology
The new media technology have one outstanding
characteristic: they no longer provide a medium of
national integration. From a technologically
deterministic point of view — that is, if the media
affect political institutions in the way we have been
arguing — the nation itself is dropping out of sight.
How so? First of all, we are witnessing the death
of television as we knew it in the incredible
multiplication of television channels. Thanks to the
technological capacity of cable and satellite, plus
the capitulation of governments to the behests of
the media barons, the shared national experience of
broadcasting is being dramatically impoverished. It
is ironic to see how conservative governments,
presumably committed to patriotism, succumb to
the temptations of privatizing the broadcasting
system and undermining the centrality of public
broadcasting. Scandal and sensation seem to be byproducts of this populistic competition, and the
news will soon be driven out of prime time. Indeed,
we are witnessing a deep crisis in public
broadcasting everywhere. Faced with the cruel
choice of becoming an elitist channel for the
politically and culturally minded, or a mass
channel that is hardly different from its private
competitors, its future, even its survival, is very
uncertain.
Even more striking is the proliferation of
segmented channels, aiming for ethnic or religious
audiences, or for specialty audiences interested
only in sports, or arts, or news — but cut off from
the majority of the population. The central arena,
the public forum in which different kinds of people
could talk to, or at least listen to, each other is
fading away.
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Both the mere multiplication of channels, and now
the rise of specialized channels, are changing the
character of public space. Television is no longer
uniting us; it is a different medium, even if we
continue to give it the same 40% of our leisure
time.
And now the internet is rising rapidly as the
predominant medium of communication, but
certainly not as a medium of national integration.
For the first time in 100 years, the nation is out of
focus. With all its magnificent potential, the
internet is geared toward transnational networks of
communication — diasporas, if you like, and other
particular interests — as well as the intimacy of
private communication. Combined with a
broadcasting capability, it has the potential of
reaching a national audience, but it is unlikely to do
so, or so it seems to me.
If one were to sum up the apparent `teleology' of
present-day media, one might say that it has two
tendencies — one toward individuation, the other
toward globalization. Individuation means that the
new media can tailor themselves and their messages
to highly particularistic tastes: one can design the
newspaper one wishes (`anything but the Middle
East,' for example), or program for the tastes of a
sub-group. Globalism means that certain messages
and genres — the World Cup, or the Pope, or
`Dallas' — can captivate everybody everywhere.
Note that neither of these tendencies makes room
for the nation-state. To the list of democratic
institutions undermined by the electronic media —
even while contributing to democratic participation
— we can now add the nation itself: parliament,
party, nation. Rhetorically, this adds to a pretty
picture: the press consolidated the nation and
defrocked charisma; the new media reinstated
charisma and undermined the nation.
Part III.
Where Are We?
Welcome to post-modernism. It is very difficult to
decide where reality is. On the one hand, we have
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some evidence that the public sphere is functioning,
from the American study I have reported,and from
a Flemish study, which sounds similar. Many
people keep up with politics; they are not as
ignorant as is thought.7 They read newspapers and
watch the TV news. They talk to others, and
associate with them, in spite of the resonance of
Putnam's thesis (1995).8 They form opinions on the
issues of the day. They act — though only a
minority do more than vote, and even voting is in
decline.9 Fewer than half of all Americans actually
present themselves at the polling places for national
elections; ironically more watch the pre-election
debates on TV.
On the other hand, we see that the institutions of
democracy are faltering, and perhaps the media are
partly to blame. The broadcast media, and now the
internet, reach people at home, over the heads of
the parliament, the political party, and even the
nation. We wanted the media to be an independent
voice, and to provide a platform, but within a
shared constituency, not an amorphous mass
society offering an illusory sense of empowerment.
The message is consumerism, the cynical
entertainment of political scandal, the PR of establishments, and the seductions of globalism.
True, the internet provides much more opportunity
for reaction and participation — it is a great
medium for organizing a pressure group — but very
few internet users seem to spend time on
citizenship when they are on line. And creeping
commercialism is rampant here too.
I want to explore two implications that arise from
this discussion, and to offer them not as conclusions but as puzzles, as dilemmas for theory and
research.
The first puzzle might be entitled `citizens
without democracy', or in a more familiar form,
`citizens without a nation'. This title reverses
Robert Entman's (1989) Democracy Without
Citizens, which implied that the system works
reasonably well, even without much participation;
this paper argues, instead, that there is participation,
or what looks like participation, but that the
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framework has collapsed. There are a lot of people
treading the waters of participatory politics, but
they aren't getting anywhere. Lazarsfeld and
Merton's `narcotizing dysfunction' sums up this
kind of ritualism by pointing to the heavy consumers of news who delude themselves into believing that they are `in' politics, while their
attentiveness, conversation, even their opinions, do
not get beyond the living room. There is a shortcircuit, in other words. Many citizens are
performing their responsibilities, or trying to, but
the mechanisms for communicating and aggregating their actions have somehow eroded.
The missing links are the institutions: the
voluntary organizations, the trade unions, the
political parties, the parliament who, ironically, are
being experienced as psychologically more distant,
even if communication with them is ostensibly
easier, not more difficult. Political institutions are
weakened, and the public sphere itself — as
embodied in the media, at least — is being
commercialized, addressing audiences as consumers rather than citizens. In spite of Inglehart (1997),
egoism and materialism are rampant; the shopping
mall has outdistanced the public square, the town
meeting, the legislature and the political party.
People have more confidence in commercial
organizations than in political ones, including
journalism (Wyatt, unpublished). We appear to be
creeping back to the classic mass society model
where charismatic leaders and masses had unmediated access to each other (Kornhauser, 1959).
Now, even the leaders have lost moral authority.
Perhaps one of the two parts is simply incorrect.
A cursory review of the evidence would suggest
that part one — on citizen participation — is the
better supported, but part two — on institutional
failure — is more convincing. If they are both true,
how else can the two pieces of this puzzle be
reconciled? Is there a better way?
The second puzzle is related. Its ultimate concern is with the future of public broadcasting. It
will argue, from part one, that citizens would want
to strengthen public broadcasting, and from part
two, that the institutions for accomplishing this are
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out of reach, or non-existent.
The way to think about this, in my opinion, is to
note the symbiotic relationship between the
structure of the media and structure of society,
without prejudging (as part two tended to do)
which comes first. Israel is the case I know best.
During the strongly collectivistic nation-building
phase of the society, there were plural social
movements, each rallied around a newspaper,
pursuing a common goal in radically different
ways, but united around monopoly broadcasting,
first radio then television. During the trying days of
the radio era, people followed the news on the hour,
and discussed it in the streets, at work, at
community and party and union meetings, and at
home. Television gathered everybody — and I
mean everybody, or almost everybody — for the 9
p.m. news. It was an unwritten rule not even to
make telephone calls during these 30-40 minutes,
and to be prepared to discuss the agenda next
morning at work. With greater security and prosperity, materialism and egoism gained ground. This
was reflected in the rise of consumerist institutions,
and, in parallel, the introduction of a second
advertising-based, commercial TV channel. Later,
when separatist yearnings began to displace
pluralism with multiculturalism, we observe the rise
of specialized broadcasting channels, and a gradual
retreat from major channels. Most viewing, as
Curran (1998) insists for the UK, is still with the
two over-the-air channels, but my bet is that this
will gradually dissipate — unless a crisis, or better a
basketball game, brings us together again as a
nation. The structure of nation and media are
closely interlinked, not only in Israel.
True, a strong broadcasting system can hold a
nation together. But let us now add: only if it wants
to be held together. In spite of the technological
flavour of this paper, I am afraid that the latter is
prerequisite to the former. For public broadcasting,
this means that “it takes a nation.”
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The vigour of culture and broadcasting in Quebec
provides an interesting contemporary example.
Let me reiterate what we mean, or used to mean,
by public broadcasting. It is a media system (1)
based on a society of shareholders — a citizenry
that owns, and feels that it owns, the system. It is
(2) administered by a board of trusted, civicminded, and creative people who protect it
jealously against the infringements of government
and commerce. It is (3) staffed by professionals
whose motto is that the customer — that is, the
citizen — is not always right, but needs to be well
served. Its programming is guided (4) by criteria of
quality and relevance, with an eye to the continuity
of cultures of the nation and of the groups that
constitute it, (5) by concern for diversity of
expression — even competing news programmes
are thinkable, for example, and (6) by a
commitment to broadcast news and public affairs in
prime time. Its hallmark is (7) that the plurality of
groups and interests that make up the society see
and hear each other in the same arena — on matters
of civics and of culture — along with the
professional voices of broadcasters and experts.
From which it follows (8) that it is viewed by
everybody, more or less. Incidentally, this is why
one can argue that a monopoly public

___________________________________

system — a one-channel society — may be more
democratic than a multi-channel one.
I repeat, to reinstate this kind of broadcasting
system would seem to require a renewed commitment to the idea of nation. Pluralism to be sure, but
an imagined community of shared identity along
with institutions that make it work.
Transnational identities, multinational interests,
and the technologies of communication may be
making the nation superfluous. With it, the will for
a nation may wither. New social arrangements may
be making for new forms of identity and new
structures of participation that will displace the
kinds of allegiance and investment — emotional
and rational — that accompanied national
citizenship. The nation may be reduced to a mere
administrative unit, defined geographically for
convenience. Perhaps that might even make for a
better world, one that spares us from the excesses
of nationalism.
The puzzle with which I leave you is whether
there is any other way to reinstate the kind of public
broadcasting which would suit the apparent desire
for a participatory democracy, and whether the idea
of repairing the nation in order to repair public
broadcasting isn't asking too much.
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Notes
1.This is one of a series of overlapping papers seeking to develop appropriate concepts for treating the social implications
of new media technologies. Previously published papers include Katz (1992), Katz (1996), Katz (1998b).
2.Daniel Boorstein (1964) was one of the first to make this point.
3.On the development of Tarde's thought, especially the transition from crowds to publics, see Clark (1969), Moscovici
(1985) and van Ginneken (1992).
4.In the Columbia voting studies (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948), women were influenced by men, usually husbands, far more than
men were influenced by women.
5.In one passage, Klemperer (1998) expresses surprise that Hitler's speech did not command attention in a public place.
6.There is much to be said in defence of these debates, nevertheless. See Kraus (1962).
7.For a discussion of what American citizens do and don't `know,' see Delli Carpini(1996).
8.Several studies seriously dispute Putnam’s generalization that there is a decline in organizational membership in the
United States. Nevertheless, his thesis has attracted widespread interest, and `sounds' convincing to many.
9.Michael Schudson (1998) and other theorists are less concerned over the decline in citizen participation, if there is one.
They believe that representative democracy locates political debate where it belongs, in the parliament, and that citizens
should oversee the performance of their representatives and give support, or withdraw it, at the polls.
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